Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of concentration by Lapteacru, Ion
 
The European Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
Vol. 9, n. 1, pp. 79-102 
ISSN 1824-2979 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: 
the application of a new measure of concentration 
Ion Lapteacru
1 
Abstract: 
This paper has a twofold interest. First, we construct new concentration measures that alleviate some 
shortcomings of the most frequently applied indexes, which are Herfindahl-Hirshman and Entropy 
measures. They also provide additional information about the way in which the loan portfolio is 
concentrated according to sectoral funding size. Second, we aim to find the factors that explain the 
banking lending concentration in Bulgaria. Applying a dynamic-panel model, it is shown that liquidity, 
loan portfolio level and the level of money in circulation influence the way in which the Bulgarian banks 
lend to different economic sectors. It should be mentioned that only liquidity level influences the loan 
concentration, if it is measured with Herfindahl-Hirshman and Entropy indexes, which suggest that these 
concentration measures perform worse than our global concentration index. 
JEL Classification: G21, C43. 
Keywords: Global Concentration Index, alpha-concentration, beta-concentration, banking, 
Bulgaria. 
1. Introduction 
The issue of the measures of concentration is a long-standing debate. The most 
frequently applied measure of concentration, at least in banking, is the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index (HHI). It is used, for instance, in studies focusing on the relationship 
between market structure and banks’ performance, but also by banking authorities to 
examine the impact on competition of the eventual mergers and acquisitions
2. Despite 
its popularity, this concentration measure is much criticised. Its frequent usage is due to 
the fact that it is simple to calculate.  
Another simply constructed concentration measure is the Entropy Index (EI). It 
was frequently applied to assess the industrial firms’ strategy, and, to our knowledge, 
never to banking. The construction principle is the same as for the HHI, the weights 
attached to market shares are only different: HHI assigns higher weights to higher 
shares whereas the EI assigns to higher shares lower weights. Thus, both indexes are 
subject to “weight bias”.  
Many other measures have been proposed. Among them, market share inequality 
indexes of Rhoades (1995) reveal the inequality among firms even within markets with 
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The Federal Reserve Board (see any published Board order on a bank merger), as well the European 
Central Bank (see EU banking structures), estimates regularly this concentration measure in order to 
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similar HHIs. Nevertheless, they are not exempt from some weaknesses. As Rhoades 
(1995) mentions, two of them are very sensitive about the number of firms, which 
increase rapidly with the increment in number of firms. Another inequality measure is 
the difference between the largest and smallest market shares. The latter concentration 
measure has, as other concentration measures, a weight bias, placing greater weight on 
larger market share differences. 
Two of the market share inequality measures of Rhoades (1995) have been used 
by Hannan (1997) along with the inequality part of the HHI, in order to assess their 
effects on the bank deposit and loan rates. His results are inconclusive in explaining the 
deposit interest rates. For the loan-rate analysis, it arises that only the number of firms 
influences the small business loan rates.  
Even if some transformations have been made, all these inequality measures are 
not completely exempted from the effect of the number of firms. An original research is 
that of Melnik et al. (2008) where the authors propose a dominance measure in order to 
disclose the firm with the dominant position. For this reason it has a limited interest for 
assessing the market concentration
3. Nevertheless, neither the inequality measures of 
Rhoades (1995) nor the dominance measure of Melnik et al. (2008) gauge the market 
concentration and so are not of interest in our study. 
In our opinion, a concentration measure must not be influenced by the number of 
entities existing in the market, only the share they own should determine the market 
concentration. This could easily be corrected by the normalisation of the HHI and EI, 
as they take values between zero and one regardless of the number of firms on the 
market. However, the weight bias that characterises these concentration measures will 
always be present. As will be discussed below, this sensitivity on the weight attached to 
market shares makes different values for these two concentration measures and 
different rates of evolution, even if the sense of the evolution is the same. The measure 
we introduce in this paper avoids all weight problems. 
Thus, this work presents a twofold interest. First, we propose a new methodology 
to estimate a concentration index that avoids any weight bias. It is based on the same 
approach as the Gini index and allows the determination of the shape of the Lorenz 
curve. We use this new measure to assess the sectoral lending concentration in Bulgaria. 
The market shares used are therefore the share of each economic activity in a lending 
portfolio. Thus, this new approach provides information on the loan distribution across 
economic sectors. The case of a small number of sectors receiving the most funding 
corresponds to what we call beta-concentration. In the case of a large number of highly 
financed sectors, the loan portfolio is said to be alpha-concentrated. Second, we assess 
the evolution of the sectoral concentration of bank loans and determine its factors for 
Bulgaria, and compare these results with those obtained with the normalised HHI and 
EI. 
We choose to make our study on the case of the Bulgarian lending market since it 
underwent a marked evolution of the economic sectoral concentration due to several 
banking crises which occurred in the nineties and also experienced many banking 
                                                 
3 On the market dominance see Hay and Vickers (1987). The authors explain the ways in which the 
dominance can be acquired, exercised and maintained.  I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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reforms. Once the non-performing loans ratio began to decline, Bulgarian banks 
gradually adopted a new approach for financing the economy and it was reflected in the 
way in which the different sectors of economy are financed.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of the empirical studies on the use of the different concentration measures, and some 
reasons to be in search of other measures of concentration. In the third section we 
explain the similarities and dissimilarities between the Herfindahl-Hirschman and 
Entropy indexes, showing how they give different results for the same objective. In the 
fourth section, we explain the construction of a new concentration index that by its 
nature gives more information on the way in which the concentration occurs. Section 5 
examines the determinants of loan concentration for Bulgarian banks by applying the 
new concentration indexes and compares the results with those obtained with the 
normalised HHI and EI. Section 6 summarizes the main ideas and concludes. 
2. Brief literature review 
Many studies have begun to consider the entropy index as a measure of 
concentration (or diversification, depending on the context) from the seventies
4, when 
the first works gave preference to this index with respect to the HHI. Jacquemin and 
Berry (1979, p. 363), for instance, affirm that, due to different weights that are assigned 
to market shares, small differences in large shares make little difference to the value of 
the EI, while the HHI responds more considerably. Conversely, very small shares are 
much ignored by the HHI. They estimate the role of the two concentration measures on 
the growth of the firms’ assets and conclude on the advantage of the EI with respect to 
the HHI. This feature of the EI, which makes it more sensitive to small shares, led 
Gemba and Kodama (2001) to use this concentration measure in their research on 
diversification dynamics of the Japanese industry.  
The majority of papers on diversification applied the EI as measure of 
diversification and not the HHI, as the former can be decomposed directly “into 
additive elements which define the contribution of diversification at each level of 
product aggregation to the total” (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979 p. 361). According to this, 
Raghunathan (1995) refines the entropy concept to measure the diversification as well as 
the entropy formula to estimate the firms’ diversification. However, in his improved 
concept of entropy, the new measure is still a weighted index.  
The EI’s feature that consists of weighting the very small shares more, making it 
very sensitive to them and for which the cited authors used it in their concentration (or 
diversification) market research becomes a weakness for Stigler (1968, p. 33). He gives 
preference to the HHI as the more eloquent of the two as a measure of market 
concentration. For similar reasons, Grant et al. (1988) used the HHI but with the 
objective of studying industry diversification. Despite this, the HHI is the most applied 
index used to measure market concentration or market structure. 
In banking it is the only index used. There are, for example, many studies that test 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis in the banking industry. Some 
                                                 
4 See, among others, Horowitz (1970) and the works of Jacquemin (Jacquemin and Kumps, 1971; 
Jacquemin, 1975; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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papers examine the SCP hypothesis throughout the relationship between the market 
concentration, measured by the HHI, and the profit rates of banks. Pilloff (1999), Pilloff 
and Rhoades (2002) and Rhoades (1995) find a result that is consistent with current 
practice of bank antitrust; that is, a concentration market implies higher profit rates. 
This is not really the case for Berger (1995), who finds that a positive relationship 
between banking market concentration and banks’ profits disappears when a measure of 
the cost efficiency of banks is added to the regression as an independent variable, which 
is consistent with the efficient-structure hypothesis. The HHI was also applied in 
regressions to estimate its effects on the interest rates that banks pay on deposits 
(Hannan, 1997; Sharpe, 1997) or charge on loans (Hannan, 1991, 1997; Hannan and 
Liang, 1995)
5. The results are not conclusive in the case of the deposit interest rate and 
they are clearly in favour of the SCP hypothesis in the case of the loan rates. In the case 
of the deposit rates, also applying the HHI as measure of concentration, Hannan and 
Berger (1991) find that banks in more concentrated markets are less likely to change 
deposit rates. In a previous paper, these authors, with the same concentration measure, 
examine the price-concentration relationship and confirm the SCP hypothesis (Berger 
and Hannan, 1989). 
Other series of papers examine, for example, the role of market concentration or 
competition, measured by the HHI, on the banks’ efficiency scores. Maudos et al. 
(2002) find, on the European banks’ example, that within a more concentrated market 
the banks’ cost efficiency scores improve and the profit efficiency scores deteriorate. 
Other authors use the concentration HHI measure to control the cost function from 
which is extracted the cost efficiency scores (among others, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 
2000, and Staikouras et al., 2008).  
The question which we raise in the next section is how well the HHI and EI 
describe the market structure. That is, how the assignation of different weights to 
market shares changes the values on market concentration. To assess these effects, we 
analyse the standard concentration measures and the differences among them. 
3. The HHI and EI concentration measures 
With respect to the loan market, the HHI and EI concentration measures differ 
according to the weight wi attached to the share of the loan portfolio in the sector i, si. 
For the N sectors, both concentration indexes can be written as 
∑
=
=
N
i
i is w CI
1
.              ( 1 )  
If the sectoral loan exposure is used as its own weight (wi=si), then greater weights 
are attached to higher exposures, which is the case of the HHI. Conversely, if each 
sectoral loan exposure is weighted by the negative value of its logarithm (wi=-ln(si)), then 
smaller weights are attached to higher exposures, which is the case of the EI.  
                                                 
5 See Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003) for a detailed literature review on the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
hypothesis in banking. I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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3.1 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
The HHI is the most widely applied concentration measure in economics, namely 
in banking, and it is written as follows:  
∑
=
=
N
i
i s HHI
1
2 .            ( 2 )  
It emphasises the importance of larger sectoral loans and takes its minimum for 
si=1/N, and its maximum for si=1. The results obtained with this method cannot be 
compared since the lower limit of the HHI changes with the number of sectors N. 
Thus, it is better to normalise the HHI so that it takes values within the range [0,1] 
regardless of the number N. In that case, the index will be written as:  
N
N HHI
HHIn 1 1
1
−
−
= .             ( 3 )  
3.2 The Entropy measure of concentration 
As for the EI, it has the following form: 
∑
=
− =
N
i
i i s s EI
1
ln
.             ( 4 )  
Thus, it ranges between 0, when loans are concentrated into a single sector, and 
ln(N), when loans are distributed equally among all sectors. Thus, the results obtained 
with this equation cannot be compared since the upper limit of the EI changes with the 
number of sectors N. The Entropy Index must be also normalised according to the 
following formula  
() N
EI
EIn ln
1− = .           ( 5 )  
As it may be observed, both indexes imply the absence of the concentration for 
si=1/N; that is, when loans are distributed uniformly across the N sectors. Nevertheless, 
the “weight bias” implies different results (see Appendix), which leads us to propose a 
new concentration measure. 
4. A new concentration index 
In this section, we construct a new concentration index to avoid the “weight bias” 
of the HHI and EI by making use of a methodology that is completely different from 
that of equation (1). This methodology refers to the shape of the loan distribution 
function and does not assign a specific weight to sectoral exposure. In this section, the EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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proposed methodology is described first. We then explain the alpha- and beta-
concentrations and construct a global measure of concentration.  
4.1 Methodology 
Let us consider a loan portfolio with N economic sectors with amount Gi 
attributed to the sector i. A loan concentration can be depicted with a Lorenz diagram, 
which presents a relationship between the share of the first n sectors in the portfolio 
structure, Tn/TN, and the proportion of these n sectors in the total number of economic 
sectors,  n/N, where  ∑
=
=
n
i
i n G T
1
. In the Lorenz diagram (see Figure 1), sectors are 
ranked according to the loan size.  
 
Figure 1. Lorenz diagram for loan distribution. 
 
Note: This figure depicts the Lorenz diagram for a loan distribution across twenty sectors. The line passing through these 
points describes the sectoral loan distribution function that must be found.  
 
The intent of our approach is to find an interpolation function that describes the 
loan distribution across economic sectors. Analysing the Lorenz diagram, this function 
could be derived from the following expression:  
1 1 = ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ + ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
α β
N
n
T
T
N
n
.          ( 6 )  I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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This function is depicted in Figure 2 for different values of parameters α and β. α 
and β describe the loan concentration on the bottom and on the top of the diagram, 
respectively, and both constitute concentration measures. Particularly, if α>β, the 
concentration is made rather on the bottom than on the top of the diagram. This 
signifies that there are very few sectors with small loans and the amounts allocated to 
them are incomparably small. Thus, the sectoral concentration is due to the presence of 
few very small sectors in the loan portfolio. Conversely, if α<β, the concentration is 
present on the top of the diagram. There are many sectors with small loans and few 
sectors with large loans. We will name the first kind of concentration as alpha-
concentration (when α>β) and the second one as beta-concentration (when α<β). As is 
depicted in Figure 2, the concentration is considered without substantial amount 
differences among sectors when α=β. In particular, α=β=1 corresponds to the case 
where loans are distributed uniformly across sectors and where concentration is 
completely absent. Moreover, β=∞ implies that all loans are assigned to a single sector.  
 
Figure 2. The function of loan distribution for different kinds of concentration. 
 
Note: This figure shows the interpolation curve for different values of alpha and beta coefficients. α>β means that the 
concentration is made rather on the bottom than on the top of the Lorenz diagram. It is an alpha-concentration. If α<β, the 
concentration is more present on the top of the diagram. In this case, it is a question of beta-concentration. α=β=1 
corresponds to uniform sectoral loan distribution. β=∞ implies that all loans are allocated to a single sector. 
 
The great advantage of these coefficients is that they give essential information 
concerning the form of function of loan distribution, regardless of the weights attached 
to sectoral exposure. Moreover, the alpha- and beta-concentration measures are not 
bound, which make them more sensitive to the sectoral structure of a loan portfolio. 
They range from 1, for uniform loan distribution, to infinity, for loan concentration for 
a single sector (when β=∞). EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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The objective is thus to find the coefficients α and β. This will be done by 
applying the minimisation criterion of the distance between the interpolation 
distribution function and the distribution points. Consequently, according to the Lorenz 
diagram, one has to minimize the following function: 
2
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 ∑∑
== ⎪
⎭
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.         ( 7 )  
We take the square of difference in order to minimize the distance both for points 
above and below the interpolation function. Thus, with this methodology only the fact 
that the interpolation function must be nearest to the distribution points is explored.  
4.2 Alpha- and beta-concentrations 
In order to make clearer the role of α and β parameters, we take as an example the 
five scenarios presented in the Appendix. The values of these parameters are presented 
in Table 1. For Scenario 1, the alpha-concentration is justified by the fact that the first 
two sectors have a share in the portfolio that does not exceed 5%. This is also the case 
for the first half of the sectors of Scenario 2 and for the first sector of Scenario 3 for 
which the concentration remains to be of type alpha. The situation changes with 
Scenario 4, where the number of sectors with higher loans is much fewer than that of 
sectors with smaller loans. This scenario gives an example of beta-concentrated 
portfolio. If the loans are relatively concentrated on the one sector, which is the case for 
Scenario 5, the parameter β is very high. 
 
Table 1. Alpha and beta parameters of the loan distribution for five scenarios described in Table A1.  
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5 
α  1.83 2.63 1.17 1.10 1.00 
β  1.03  1.00  1.00  4.29  54.88 
GCI  0.305 0.449 0.078 0.643 0.964 
HHIn  0.030  0.088  0.008  0.241  0.929 
EIn  0.066 0.209 0.024 0.462 0.906 
Note: This table gives the results of parameters α and β of the loan distribution according to five scenarios described in Table 
A1. They are estimated minimizing the function (7). The alpha-concentration is present for the first three scenarios and beta-
concentration for the last two. The GCI is estimated according to the equation (8). 
 
4.3 Global measure of concentration 
The parameters α and β describe the form of the loan distribution function 
(equation 6), providing important information about the way in which the loans are 
distributed. However, they do not provide a global view on the loan distribution.  I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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Figure 3. Geometrical interpretation of the Global Concentration Index. 
 
Note: This figure presents the geometrical interpretation of the Global Concentration Index (GCI). The area between the 
curve of the Lorenz diagram and the bisecting line gives the value of half of the GCI. If loans are uniformly allocated across 
sectors, then the curve of the Lorenz diagram fits the bisecting line and the area between them is equal to zero. In this case, 
the GCI/2 is 0, and GCI=0. On the other hand, if all loans are allocated only to one sector, the curve of the Lorenz 
diagram lays out along the x-axis until 1 and then rises along the y-axis until 1. This implies GCI=1, as the area between 
the curve of the Lorenz diagram and the bisecting line is equal to 0.5. 
 
In the Lorenz diagram, if loans are distributed uniformly, the distribution curve 
coincides with the bisecting line. In this case of absence of concentration, there is no 
region between the Lorenz curve and the bisecting line and the area between these two 
curves is thus zero. On the other hand, if all loans are allocated to a single sector, the 
curve of the Lorenz diagram lays out along the x-axis till x=1 and then rises along the y-
axis till y=1. In that case, the area between the curve of the Lorenz diagram and the 
bisecting line is maximum and equal to 0.5. Thus, the area between the curve of the 
Lorenz diagram and the bisecting line could be a good measure of a Global 
Concentration Index (GCI) (see Figure 3). This index takes zero when there is no 
concentration on the market and loans are uniformly distributed across economic 
sectors and a maximum value when there is a complete concentration of loans to a 
single sector. In order to ensure that the GCI takes values between 0 and 1, like the 
normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman and Entropy indexes, we multiply by two the area 
between the curve of the Lorenz diagram and the bisecting line, as follows: 
() ∫ ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
− − − =
1
0
1
1 1 2 1 dx x GCI β α ,           ( 8 )  
where x=n/N. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Thus, in our opinion, the GCI results in being a good global concentration index. 
Its main advantage is that it avoids the “weight bias” taking into consideration just the 
form of the loan function. Continuing the above example with five scenarios of loan 
distribution, we find that the GCI takes values that are very different from those of the 
HHIn and EIn (see Table 1). Being exempt from the “weight bias”, we prefer the Global 
Concentration Index in order to find the determinants of sectoral loan concentration for 
Bulgarian banks.  
5. Determinants of loan concentration for Bulgarian banks 
We will try to find the determinants for the GCI and alpha-concentration index. 
The beta-concentration cannot be studied since there are too few cases where beta 
exceeds alpha. Thus, Bulgarian banks grant loans in the way in which there are few 
sectors with small loans. One could thus depict the factors that push banks to have 
many sectors with a high amount of loans in their portfolio, which would not be 
possible with the HHIn and EIn concentration indexes. To do this, we will first of all 
present the econometric methodology and then discuss the obtained results. 
5.1 Econometric methodology 
To study the determinants of sectoral loan concentration we use the panel data 
for all Bulgarian banks. With this data base, we apply the following panel model with 
fixed effects: 
, / 3 1 10 1 9 8 7
1 6 1 4 3 2 1
it t t it it
it t it it it t i it
GDPGR GDP M Foreign Size
IM IBIR Loan Portf Liq CI
ε β β β β
β β β β β χ η
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
− −
− −    (9) 
where i represents the bank’s index and t the temporal index. CI expresses the 
concentration index and characterizes two different concentration types: the alpha-
concentration (αc) and Global Concentration Index. The former is estimated as a 
difference between parameters alpha and beta and is “truncated” below zero, which will 
reduce the number of observation compared to regressions with the GCI. 
We could distinguish five types of factors that are likely to influence the way in 
which banks grant loans. The first type is related to prudential regulation that was 
introduced in Bulgaria in the late 1990s. Liquidity is one of such factors since banks 
must ensure a minimum level of liquidity in order to meet regularly and without delay 
their daily obligations. Such obligation was imposed to Bulgarian banks after the 
banking crisis of 1996.
6 Thus, it is not unlikely that in the conditions of scarce funds 
banks try to meet this obligation at the expense of loans, which explains the use of the 
liquidity level (Liq), measured as the ratio of the bank liquidities to bank total assets. 
Another series of factors relates to the arbitrage investment policy of the banks: 
the increase in investment portfolio size is often made to the detriment of the loan 
portfolio. Thus, the level of investment portfolio (Portf) could indirectly influence the 
                                                 
6 The Ordinance Liquidity Management and Supervision of Banks of the Bulgarian National Bank was 
approved and introduced in 1997. I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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concentration lending decision. It is determined as the ratio of the portfolio size to bank 
total assets. 
The third type of factors directly influence the way in which loans are allocated. 
Among them, we will consider the size of loan portfolio (Loan), measured as the ratio of 
loan amount to total bank assets, and the profitability of the lending activity, expressed 
by the interest margin (IM). The profitability of lending activity can induce banks to lend 
more, which could imply a modification on the sectoral loan portfolio concentration. It 
is determined as the difference between the profitability of the interest-earning assets, 
measured as the ratio of interest revenues to total interest-earning assets, and the unitary 
cost of the interest-bearing liabilities, measured as the ratio of interest expenses to total 
interest-bearing liabilities. 
As for bank characteristics, the size and type of banks could affect their activities, 
namely in such emerging countries as Bulgaria, where large banks and foreign 
institutions could have different lending strategies. The larger the banks are, the higher 
their market power and respectively the more aggressive their development strategy 
could be. This type of bank could therefore lend only to the highest performing firms, 
their loan portfolio being concentrated into few economic sectors. This could be the 
same for foreign banks, since in most cases they also have the highest assets. Moreover, 
these banks own external funds from their parent banks, giving them more power to 
gain the highest-yield market sectors. The bank’s size (Size) is measured by the logarithm 
of its total assets and we include a dummy variable Foreign that takes one if more than 
50% of bank capital is owned by foreign institutions, and zero otherwise.  
We also add some control variables, which reflect the evolution of the economic 
environment in terms of monetary policy, the increase in money supply and economic 
growth. Den Haan et al. (2007), for instance, find that the banks’ behaviour changes 
with the evolution of monetary policy: the restrictive monetary policy implies the 
concentration of the loans for the commercial and industrial sectors to the detriment of 
consumption and mortgage purposes. Since the exchange regime in Bulgaria is a 
currency board linked to the euro, there is no independent monetary policy. The inter-
banking interest rate (IBIR) will therefore be considered as a proxy variable of the 
monetary policy in Bulgaria.  
The money stock in circulation could describe the facility with which economic 
agents have access to bank financing. We consider the largest monetary aggregate M3 as 
a fraction of Gross Domestic Product. The last control variable is the real growth of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDPGR) since it allows for taking into account the demand 
factor for loan supply and thus could influence the sectoral concentration of the loan 
portfolio.  
The control variables, but also the variables that reflect the banks’ performance as 
the interest margin, are delayed by one period (quarter). The reason is that banks do not 
respond instantly to the evolution of the economic environment, monetary policy and 
the banking market situation, and to the changing of their profitability variables. We 
thus consider that lagged variables are economically more pertinent. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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5.2 Data and results 
From 2003 to 2006 the Bulgarian National Bank published the quarterly banks’ 
balance-sheet, profit-and-loss accounts and the banks’ loan portfolio decomposition by 
economic sector activity. Thanks to the complete data availability, the study concerns 
the whole Bulgarian banking sector that comprises 35 banks. We have 16 periods and 
the loan portfolio structure contains six sectors: 1) real estate and construction loans, 2) 
commercial loans, 3) agricultural loans, 4) consumer loans, 5) housing mortgage loans, 
and 6) other loans.  
The use of data for all banks excludes any random effects; this is the reason why 
we rather consider the fixed effects in the equation (9). The structure of this equation 
and the nature of the dependent and independent variables suggest the use of the 
dynamic-panel methodology, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The following 
reasons lead us to apply dynamic-panel estimators to find the determinants of the 
sectoral loan portfolio concentration. First, there are few time periods, 16, compared 
with the number of banks, 35. Second, the equation (9) has a linear functional 
relationship. Third, the concentration indexes could also depend on their own past, 
realisations making them as dynamic variables. Fourth, the independent variables are not 
strictly exogenous, that is correlated with past and possibly current realisation of the 
error term. For instance, the amount of loans and the interest margin could cause and 
be influenced by the way in which the loan portfolio is concentrated. Thus, the causality 
may run in both directions: from Loans and the interest margin (IM) to concentration 
indexes (CI), and vice versa. Fifth, the equation (9) is characterized by fixed individual 
effects. 
Thus, in order to find the determinants of the sectoral loan portfolio 
concentration for Bulgarian banks, we apply the Arrellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
difference estimator. The variables are instrumented by their own series. Only the 
concentration index, as a dependent variable, is instrumented by its difference series 
with lags 1 and 2. We limit to lag 2 due to the small number of periods in our sample.  
There is a risk that some independent variables of the equation (9) are to be 
correlated, which is confirmed by the correlation coefficients and their statistical 
significance levels presented in Table 2. The liquidity level (Liq) is correlated with the 
level of loan portfolio (Loan), the interest margin (IM), the size and type of banks, and 
with economic environment variables (IBIR and M3/GDP). The level of investment 
portfolio (Portf) is correlated with the level of loan portfolio as bank substitutes, with the 
interest margin and with types of banks, the interest margin with the evolution of 
monetary policy, and the economic environment variables among them. To avoid the 
autocorrelation problems, the regressions will be made without variables that are 
correlated with those employed in regression. Therefore, we will regress three types of 
equation: one with Liq, Portf and GDPGR as explicative variables, second with Loan, Size 
and  IBIR as explicative variables, and the last with IM,  Foreign and M3/GDP as 
explicative variables. 
The regression is made with a one-step GMM estimator, applying the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction for standard errors as there could be 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within banks. The results for determinants of the 
alpha-concentration, αc=α-β, are presented in Table 3 and those for determinants of the 
Global Concentration Index in Table 4. They are obtained with one and two lagged I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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dependent variables. The J-statistics of Hansen allows testing and choosing the level of 
lag to take into regression. Moreover, the Arrellano-Bond autoregressive test in first 
differences A-B test ar(1) allows us to test whether the idiosyncratic disturbance term is 
auto-correlated of order one, which is a condition of a dynamic-panel model. This 
concerns the idiosyncratic component of the error term as the fixed effects are mutually 
eliminated. 
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients among explicative variables and their p-values.  
Variables Liq  Portf  Loan IM(-1)  Size  Foreign  IBIR 
(-1)  M3/GDP(-1) GDPGR(-1)
Liq  1  0.077  -0.355 -0.333 0.126  -0.151 0.182 0.104  0.076 
Portf  0.077  1  -0.408  -0.151  0.010  -0.102  -0.006  -0.023  -0.085 
Loan  < 0.001  < 0.001  1  0.478  0.053  0.014  -0.071  0.005  0.061 
IM(-1)  < 0.001  0.001  < 0.001  1  -0.018  0.014  0.488  0.002  0.072 
Size  0.004 0.819 0.225 0.674 1  0.278 0.024  0.250  0.120 
Foreign  0.001  0.019  0.748  0.745  < 0.001  1  0.523  0.047  0.022 
IBIR(-1)  <  0.0001 0.885 0.104 0.030 0.098 0.028 1  0.524  0.263 
M3/GDP(-1)  0.017  0.596  0.900  0.965  < 0.001  0.282  < 0.001  1  0.141 
GDPGR(-1)  0.081 0.052 0.161 0.097 0.005 0.608 <  0.001  0.001  1 
Note: This table presents the correlation coefficients among explicative variables of the equation (9) and their statistical 
significance, expressed by the p-values. To the right of the figure 1 the correlation coefficients are presented and to the left of 
the figure 1 their p-values are presented. 
 
Aiming to make a robustness check, we also regress equation (9) with a two-step 
GMM estimator (models from 1’ to 6’). This estimator is asymptotically efficient and 
robust to patterns of heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation. In empirical literature, 
one-step results are often presented because of downward bias in the computed 
standard errors with two-step estimators, thus rendering some results statistically 
significant when they are not. But Windmeijer (2005) greatly reduced this problem. 
Thus, we apply the two-step GMM estimator with the Windmeijer’s correction to the 
standard errors.  
Effectively owing to the fixed effects, the error term is auto-correlated from order 
1 in differences. Moreover, the A-B test ar(2) cannot reject the absence of 
autocorrelation of order 2 in differences, at 5% significance level, for all models (from 1 
to 6, and from 1’ to 6’) and for both concentration indexes, αc and GCI (see Tables 3 
and 4). This allows for using the lag 1 in difference to the dependent variable as 
instrument. The Sargan and J-Hansen statistics are used to test the validity of 
instruments. The main assumption for the validity of GMM estimates is that the 
instruments are exogenous. A test of the null hypothesis of the instrument variables’ 
exogeneity is also performed. These statistics test for the joint validity of the moment 
conditions (identifying restrictions) that falls out of the GMM framework. The null 
hypothesis being the joint validity of instruments, the Sargan test rejects it for some 
models. But, this statistic is inconsistent if non-sphericity is suspected in error terms. In 
this case, a theoretically superior test is that based on the J-Hansen statistic. The results 
show that the Hansen test cannot reject the hypothesis of the joint validity of 
instruments and that is for all models and all concentration measures. Moreover, the 
null hypothesis of the instrument variables’ exogeneity cannot also be rejected. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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The results obtained for the alpha-concentration of the Bulgarian banks’ loan 
portfolio reveal that the first type of factors, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
(Liq), implies a reduction in alpha-concentration (models 1 and 2). The banks which 
have a higher ratio of liquid assets have a loan portfolio that is lesser alpha-concentrated 
according to economic sectors. This is the same for the ratio of investment assets to 
total assets (Portf). The increase in economic growth reduces the loan portfolio 
concentration of type alpha too. Moreover, the higher the amount of loans with respect 
to total assets, the lesser the concentration of type alpha. This result must be considered 
cautiously since the coefficient of the Loan variable is significant only for a model with 
one lagged endogenous variable for αc on the right-side of the equation (9) and only for 
the one-step GMM estimation (model 4).  
The J-statistic of Hansen, which is a GMM criterion function, allows for choosing 
the lag of the dependent variable, which means testing the relevance of additional 
restrictions. The more lags are introduced, the less restricted the model is. The J-statistic 
of the restricted model, Jr, must be larger than that of the unrestricted model, Jur. Each J-
statistic follows a chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
instruments minus the number of estimated parameters. The test of a restricted model 
with respect to an unrestricted one, that is to say the difference between Jur and Jr, is 
itself asymptotically chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between 
the degrees of freedom of each J-statistic (Greene 2003, p. 548-549). For instance, the 
identifying lag test for αc with Liq as an independent variable is performed between the 
restricted model (model 2) and unrestricted one (model 1). Jr=13.93 is higher than 
Jur=10.17, and the difference between them is 3.76 which is lesser than the critical chi-
squared value with one degree of freedom (number of degrees of freedom for Jr minus 
the number of degrees of freedom for Jur, which is the difference between the numbers 
of instruments since the number of estimated coefficients is the same for restricted and 
unrestricted models), that is 3.84 for 95 percent significance. The equation with Liq 
variable cannot thus reject the one-lag model.  
In the same way, we test the pertinence of the one-lag model with respect to two-
lag one for two other regressions. The test suggests that only the results of the two-lag 
regressions must be taken into consideration, those of the models 3 and 5. We can thus 
conclude that only Liq, Portf and GDPGR variables influence the concentration of type 
alpha for Bulgarian banks’ lending behaviour.  
But previous results are obtained with one-step GMM regressions. Making two-
step estimations we find some differences in our findings (the right-side of table 3). We 
find that the Liq and GDPGR variables have no more influence on the concentration of 
type alpha. On the other hand, the coefficients of the IM and IBIR variables become 
significant. Thus, the banks with a higher interest margin in the previous period have 
more an alpha-concentrated loan portfolio and the restriction in monetary policy 
reduces the alpha-concentration.  
According to the results presented in Table 4, we will analyse only the one-lag 
models’ results for the determinants of the Global Concentration measure, since one 
may not reject the hypothesis with restricted regressions. We find that the ratio of liquid 
assets reduces also the global concentration of the Bulgarian banks’ loan portfolio. But 
there is no longer a case for the investment portfolio level and for the profitability of I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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the banking activity. The coefficients of the Portf and IM variables are no longer 
statistically significant. 
Among economic environment variables, only the level of money in circulation 
influences the global concentration of the Bulgarian banks’ loan portfolios. This result is 
intuitively an expected one. More money in circulation facilitates the access to bank 
financing and reduces the constraint with respect to the choice of the sector to be 
financed. Thus, the banks are not constrained to lend only to some preferential 
economic sectors. 
Concerning the two-step regressions, there are no additional revealed 
determinants and those found within one-step regressions keep the statistical 
significance of their coefficients. Thus, to summarize, the banks with a higher liquidity 
level have less global concentrated loan portfolio. On the other hand, the loans are 
more concentrated according to economic sectors for banks with a higher level of loans 
on total assets. If there is more money in circulation, the Bulgarian banks lend to more 
economic sectors, thus reducing the global concentration of their loan portfolios. 
The use of the HHIn and EIn in the determination of the factors that influence 
the lending market concentration in Bulgaria provides some divergence (see tables 5 and 
6). With these measures we find no more impact of the loan level on the concentration 
of the loan portfolio. We base our conclusions only on the results of the one-lag 
regressions since the tests cannot reject the hypothesis with restricted regressions for all 
models and for both concentration measures. Moreover, with HHIn and EIn the 
evolution of the money in circulation does not keep its effect on the loan concentration 
with more robust two-step estimations.  
Thus, the only variable among those chosen to study the loan concentration of 
the Bulgarian banks that has a significant coefficient is the liquidity ratio. We therefore 
presume that the GCI performs better than the HHIn and EIn measures. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Table 3. Determinants of the alpha-concentration for the Bulgarian banks’ loan portfolios. 
Dep. var αc  1  2  3  4 5 6 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’  6’ 
αc (-1)  0.450**  0.516***  0.395**  0.383*** 0.453**  0.548*** 0.474***  0.546*** 0.407*** 0.411*** 0.404** 0.595*** 
αc (-2)  -0.137    0.003    -0.209    -0.176    -0.039    -0.355   
Liq  -2.609*  -2.843**          -1.947  -1.443       
Portf  -7.180***  -7.661***          -6.629***  -6.304***         
Loan      -6.726  -8.215**          -2.802 -5.774    
IM(-1)          45.361  62.380          55.253*  76.049** 
Size      -0.719  -0.768          -0.056 -0.299    
Foreign          -0.268  -0.201          -0.134  -0.420 
IBIR(-1)     -29.963  -29.425          -28.012** -36.998**    
M3/GDP(-1)          2.517  2.277          -1.419  2.430 
GDPGR(-1)  -0.134*  -0.119*          -0.072  -0.059       
Nr. of obs.  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456 
Nr.  of  instr.  16 17 28  29  16  17  16 17 28 29 16  17 
A-B test: ar(1) 
 ar(2) 
-2.67*** 
0.27 
-2.31** 
-1.88* 
-2.84*** 
-0.35 
-2.62*** 
-1.50 
-2.83*** 
0.68 
-2.43*** 
-1.73* 
-2.43*** 
0.51 
-2.44*** 
-1.83* 
-2.29** 
-0.15 
-2.34** 
-1.68* 
-2.53*** 
1.06 
-2.47*** 
-1.70* 
Sargan 
J-Hansen 
18.67* 
10.17 
19.07 
13.93 
28.19 
16.31 
25.36 
26.05 
18.47* 
9.24 
16.67 
17.01 
18.67* 
10.17 
19.07 
13.93 
28.19 
16.31 
25.36 
26.05 
18.47* 
9.24 
16.67 
17.01 
H0: IV exog  0.85  5.46  0.06  3.68  3.72  6.72*  0.85  5.46  0.06  3.68  3.72  6.72 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the equation (9) with one- and two-steps GMM robust estimator for alpha-concentration Index. The left-side of the table presents the results with one-
step estimator and the right-side those obtained with two-step estimator. J-statistic of Hansen allows choosing the level of lag of the dependent variable. Arrelano-Bond autoregressive test permits to test 
for dynamic-panel model, in which case ar(1) test must reject the null hypothesis of lack of autocorrelation and ar(2) test must not reject it. Sargan and Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions detects 
roughly the joint validity of instruments. The difference-in-Hansen tests checks for the exogeneity of instrument variables. ***, **, * mean that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of concentration 
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Table 4. Determinants of the GCI for the Bulgarian banks’ loan portfolios. 
Dep. var 
GCI  1 2 3  4  5 6 1’  2’  3’  4’  5’  6’ 
GCI(-1) 0.637***  0.616***  0.672***  0.738*** 0.819***  0.621***  0.638***  0.670*** 0.702***  0.790*** 0.964*** 0.724*** 
GCI(-2)  -0.041    0.262    -0.204    -0.026    0.291    -0.299   
Liq  -0.167*** -0.175***         -0.153*** -0.173***        
Portf  -0.110  -0.098          -0.063  -0.069         
Loan    0.287***  0.259**      0.255**  0.226*    
IM(-1)          2.335  0.866          2.127  1.945 
Size    0.031  0.009      0.030  0.007    
Foreign          0.030***  -0.018          0.031***  -0.041 
IBIR(-1)    -0.430  -0.229      -0.113  -0.139    
M3/GDP(-1)          -0.789***  -0.736***          -0.703***  -0.574** 
GDPGR(-1)  -0.0006  -0.00006        -0.0002  0.0005       
Nr. of obs.  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456 
Nr. of instr.  16  17  28  29  16  17  16  17  28  29  16  17 
A-B test: ar(1) 
 ar(2) 
-2.43*** 
0.65 
-2.97*** 
0.01 
-2.00** 
-1.38 
-2.44** 
-0.06 
-2.80*** 
1.27 
-2.89*** 
0.19 
-1.65* 
0.34 
-2.78*** 
-0.03 
-1.53 
-0.87 
-2.67*** 
-0.08 
-2.09** 
1.06 
-2.82*** 
0.14 
Sargan 
J-Hansen 
21.82** 
14.62 
22.53** 
14.96 
29.60 
26.96 
34.51 
28.04 
13.55 
11.83 
21.18* 
13.69 
21.82** 
14.62 
22.53** 
14.96 
29.60 
26.96 
34.51 
28.04 
13.55 
11.83 
21.18* 
13.69 
H0: IV exog  3.51  4.03  1.82  0.90  2.50  2.66  3.51  4.03  1.82  0.90  2.50  2.66 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the equation (9) with one- and two-steps GMM robust estimator for Global Concentration Index. The left-side of the table presents the results with 
one-step estimator and the right-side those obtained with two-step estimator. J-statistic of Hansen allows choosing the level of lag of the dependent variable. Arrelano-Bond autoregressive test permits to 
test for dynamic-panel model, in which case ar(1) test must reject the null hypothesis of lack of autocorrelation and ar(2) test must not reject it. Sargan and Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 
detects roughly the joint validity of instruments. The difference-in-Hansen tests checks for the exogeneity of instrument variables. ***, **, * mean that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.  EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Table 5. Determinants of the HHIn for the Bulgarian banks’ loan portfolio. 
Dep. var 
HHIn  1  2  3 4 5 6 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’  5’  6’ 
HHIn(-1) 0.455***  0.496***  0.499***  0.588*** 0.598*** 0.546*** 0.505**  0.548***  0.521*** 0.647*** 0.667*** 0.603*** 
HHIn(-2)  -0.007    0.112    -0.101    0.05    0.095    -0.109   
Liq  -0.256***  -0.270***      -0.279**  -0.289***      
Portf  -0.090  -0.075          -0.098  -0.076         
Loan      0.324*  0.227       0.220*  0.198    
IM(-1)          1.625  0.283          1.349  0.833 
Size      0.016 0.003         -0.007  -0.005     
Foreign          0.041***  -0.018          0.035**  -0.043 
IBIR(-1)      -0.311 -0.281         -0.227 -0.312    
M3/GDP(-1)          -0.942**  -0.938**          -0.709*  -0.626 
GDPGR(-1)  -0.002  -0.001      0.0001  0.001      
Nr. of obs.  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456 
Nr.  of  instr.  16  17  28 30 16 17 16 17  28 29 16 17 
A-B test: ar(1) 
 ar(2) 
-2.03** 
0.07 
-3.18*** 
-0.77 
-2.21** 
-0.92 
-2.76*** 
-0.87 
-2.66*** 
0.66 
-3.51*** 
-0.66 
-1.56 
-0.22 
-2.98*** 
-0.91 
-1.90* 
-0.64 
-2.88*** 
-0.83 
-2.06** 
0.48 
-3.11**** 
-0.62 
Sargan 
J-Hansen 
34.41*** 
12.52 
32.89** 
13.71 
45.12*** 
24.58 
43.21** 
25.46 
26.67*** 
14.07 
30.84*** 
14.35 
34.41*** 
12.52 
32.89** 
13.71 
45.12*** 
24.58 
43.21** 
25.46 
26.67*** 
14.07 
30.84*** 
14.35 
H0: IV exog  1.76  0.87  1.72  3.17  2.42  3.38  1.76  0.87  1.72  3.17  2.42  3.38 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the equation (9) with one- and two-steps GMM robust estimator for HHIn Index. The left-side of the table presents the results with one-step 
estimator and the right-side those obtained with two-step estimator. J-statistic of Hansen allows choosing the level of lag of the dependent variable. Arrelano-Bond autoregressive test permits to test for 
dynamic-panel model, in which case ar(1) test must reject the null hypothesis of lack of autocorrelation and ar(2) test must not reject it. Sargan and Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions detects 
roughly the joint validity of instruments. The difference-in-Hansen tests checks for the exogeneity of instrument variables. ***, **, * mean that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of concentration 
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Table 6. Determinants of the EIn for the Bulgarian banks’ loan portfolios. 
Dep. var 
EIn  1  2  3 4 5  6 1’ 2’ 3’  4’  5’  6’ 
EIn(-1)  0.567*** 0.579*** 0.550***  0.668*** 0.755***  0.613*** 0.590***  0.631*** 0.573***  0.728***  0.893***  0.711*** 
EIn(-2)  -0.033    0.186    -0.182    0.006    0.143    -0.287   
Liq  -0.208*** -0.218***         -0.200*** -0.216***        
Portf  -0.139  -0.123          -0.109  -0.110         
Loan   0.271**  0.144      0.185*  0.183*     
IM(-1)          2.367  1.262          2.108  2.041 
Size    0.024  0.004      0.005  0.010     
Foreign          0.037***  -0.23          0.036***  -0.053 
IBIR(-1)    -0.453  -0.462      -0.031  -0.318     
M3/GDP(-1)          -0.839***  -0.735**          -0.745**  -0.545 
GDPGR(-1)  -0.002 -0.001         -0.001 -0.0001         
Nr. of obs.  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456  420  456 
Nr.  of  instr.  16 17 28  29  16 17 16 17 28  29  16  17 
A-B test: ar(1) 
 ar(2) 
-2.29** 
0.40 
-3.09** 
-0.38 
-2.28** 
-0.98 
-2.81*** 
-0.36 
-2.80*** 
1.18 
-3.15*** 
-0.24 
-1.51* 
0.08 
-2.92*** 
-0.44 
-1.70** 
-0.58 
-2.70*** 
-0.41 
-2.23** 
1.04 
-3.02*** 
-0.21 
Sargan 
J-Hansen 
23.52*** 
11.98 
25.93** 
12.98 
38.97** 
25.32 
37.55** 
29.12 
17.09* 
11.55 
24.25** 
13.80 
23.52*** 
11.98 
25.93** 
12.98 
38.97** 
25.32 
37.55 
29.12 
17.09* 
11.55 
24.25** 
13.80 
H0: IV exog  2.42  1.58  1.51  6.44**  0.97  1.90  2.42  1.58  1.51  6.44**  0.97  1.90 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the equation (9) with one- and two-steps GMM robust estimator for EIn Index. The left-side of the table presents the results with one-step estimator 
and the right-side those obtained with two-step estimator. J-statistic of Hansen allows choosing the level of lag of the dependent variable. Arrelano-Bond autoregressive test permits to test for dynamic-
panel model, in which case ar(1) test must reject the null hypothesis of lack of autocorrelation and ar(2) test must not reject it. Sargan and Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions detects roughly the 
joint validity of instruments. The difference-in-Hansen tests checks for the exogeneity of instrument variables. ***, **, * mean that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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6. Conclusion 
This study focused on the determinants of the sectoral loan portfolio 
concentration for Bulgarian banks. We chose this country because its banking sector 
evolved substantially as a result of the economic environment evolution and the 
regulatory requirements effect. But the main contribution of this paper is the 
construction of new concentration measures, which avoid the problem of correctly 
weighting the market shares that compose traditionally used concentration indexes.  
Thus, the interest of the present work is twofold. In the first part of the paper we 
have proposed a methodology to estimate a new, more informative concentration index 
that makes it possible to avoid the “weight bias” distorting the usually applied 
Herfindahl-Hirshman and Entropy concentration measures. It has been shown that 
these two indexes are biased and this is why a new global concentration index has been 
constructed. Two new forms of concentration, named alpha-concentration and beta-
concentration, have been revealed with our methodology. The first type of sectoral 
concentration is due to the presence of few very small sectors in the loan portfolio and 
the second one is the result of the presence of many sectors with small loans and few 
sectors with large loans. They consequently describe the loan distribution function and 
give information on the way in which economic sectors are financed.  
We then estimated the determinants of the sectoral loan portfolio concentration 
of the Bulgarian banks for the 2003-2006 period. They cannot be found for beta-
concentration due to the small number of cases associated with this kind of 
concentration. For alpha-concentration it has been shown that liquidity as well as the 
levels of investment portfolio influences it. The banks that are more liquid and have a 
larger investment portfolio have a loan portfolio that is lesser alpha-concentrated by 
economic sectors. Moreover, within an economically improving environment, the 
Bulgarian banks reduce the concentration of type alpha of their loan portfolio. Besides 
these results, with a two-step robust GMM estimator we found that the increase in 
interest margin leads the banks to grant loans in the way in which the loan portfolio 
becomes more alpha-concentrated. Another factor is the monetary policy, presented 
through the interbank interest rate. A restrictive monetary policy reduces the 
concentration of type alpha.  
The results regarding the determinants of global concentration are not similar. 
Only the liquidity ratio has the same effect. Other determinants are the levels of loans 
on total assets and of money in circulation. More loans do not mean lesser 
concentration, but conversely the banks that have a higher fraction of loans to total 
assets have also a more global sectoral concentrated portfolio. On the other hand, more 
money in circulation facilitates the access to bank financing and reduces the constraint 
with respect to the choice of the sector to be financed. If we compare these results with 
those obtained with the traditional HHIn and EIn measures, then only the liquidity ratio 
influences the economic sectoral loan concentration, which suggests that these indexes 
perform worse than the GCI. I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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Appendix: How are differences between HHI and EI expressed? 
The EI weights exposure to an economic sector by minus logarithm of this 
exposure and thus attaches more importance to least funded sectors. Inversely, the HHI 
weights exposure to an economic sector by its own value and assigns more share to 
most funded sectors. Thus, these indexes are biased and diverge in their results. 
Table A1 presents our results for the normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman and 
Entropy indexes for a loan distribution of the same amount granted across ten sectors 
and for five scenarios. The sectors are ranked in ascending order according to the loan 
amount. In the first scenario, the distribution is such that the transition is smooth from 
one sector to the following; that is, the amount of granted loans between two neighbour 
sectors is equal to 10% of the most funded sector. The values of both normalised 
concentration indexes are very close to zero, even if they are far from a uniform 
distribution. Nevertheless, the EIn is relatively much higher than the HHIn, more than 
twofold. This difference also persists in the second scenario, in which the first half of 
sectors is financed with 3 monetary units (m.u.) and the second one with 52 m.u. The 
loan portfolio is thus clearly divided in two equal separate parts, each of them having 
uniform loan distribution. Since the distributed amounts differ a lot, concentration 
increases. We can see that the EIn is more sensitive. The difference between the values 
of these two indexes appears to be even larger in the third scenario, for which we have 
the same maximum amount of 30 m.u. allocated to all sectors, except the first one for 
which the amount of 5 m.u. is granted. In scenario 4 the concentration of loans is 
already strong and the values of HHIn and EIn are higher. However, EIn is 
approximately twice as high as HHIn. Thus, the difference between these indexes is 
weakened when increasing the number of sectors endowed with the minimum amount 
of monetary units. If we attribute 1 m.u. for the first nine sectors and a maximum of 
266 m.u. to the last sector, then the HHIn even exceeds the EIn (scenario 5). 
 
Table A1. HHIn and EIn for five different sectors.  
Rank of sector by size 
(ascending order)  Scen. 1  Scen. 2  Scen. 3  Scen. 4  Scen. 5 
1  5 3 5 1 1 
2  10  3  30  1  1 
3  15  3 30  1 1 
4  20  3  30  1  1 
5  25  3 30  1 1 
6  30  52  30  1  1 
7  35 52 30 1  1 
8  40  52  30  89  1 
9  45 52 30 89 1 
10  50  52  30  90  266 
Sum  275 275 275 275 275 
HHIn  0.030  0.088  0.008  0.241  0.929 
EIn  0.066 0.209 0.024 0.462 0.906 
Note: This table depicts five different scenarios of loan distribution among ten projects, which are ranged in ascending order 
according to their loan size. The normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHIn) and Entropy (EIn) concentration indexes are 
estimated according to equations (3) and (5) respectively. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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This simple exercise shows that the EIn is more sensitive for smaller sectors when 
they are fewer and the HHIn is more sensitive for larger sectors when they are fewer. 
This is not the only difference. Our results also differ when adjusting the loan portfolio 
in order to obtain a minimum concentration. Consider a portfolio of three sectors with 
amounts of x1, x2 and x3, respectively. Let the second sector be financed with 50 m.u. 
The question is to find the portfolio structure, - that is, the amounts invested in the first 
and third sectors -, so that the portfolio concentration is minimum. Minimising the 
equation (2) and maximising the equation (4) for different values of x1 and for x2=50, 
the results for x3 are different. As is depicted in Figure A1, for the same amount 
invested in the first sector x3 is greater with HHI than with EI. The only point for 
which we obtain the same result is the point U, where x1=x2=x3=50, that is for a 
uniform loan distribution. 
 
Figure A1. Minimum portfolio concentration composed of three sectors, one of which contains 50 m.u, made 
with HHI and EI indexes. 
 
Note: This figure presents the combination of the amounts lent to the first and third sectors (x1 and x3 respectively) so that to 
obtain a minimum concentration, with 50 m.u. allowed to the second sector. For the same amount invested in the first sector, 
the HHI, which is minimized, gives a higher value for x3 than the EI, which is maximized. The only configuration for 
which the two concentration indexes give the same values is the uniform resource distribution, that is when loans are 
distributed equally (point U, x1=x2=x3=50). I. Lapteacru, Assessing lending market concentration in Bulgaria: the application of a new measure of 
concentration 
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